

# Evaluating public support to the investment activities of business firms: a meta-regression analysis of Italian studies

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# Getting into the debate

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*"Much of the political debate surrounding such programmes remains at the level of ideology. [...] Yet as social scientists we have an obligation to try to bring facts to bear on these debates. [...] the social productivity of these programmes is fundamentally an empirical question."* (Jaffe, 2002, p. 23).

- ❑ We focus on Italy, which is relatively disregarded by existing reviews and where the debate about the effectiveness of industrial policies is occasional and based on partial evidences
- ❑ We analyse the available evaluation studies – whose number has grown fast in recent years - through a systematic review of the available literature and a meta-analysis
- ❑ We introduce some novelty in the MRA by considering unobserved study heterogeneity

# Previous MRAs on enterprise and innovation policy

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- Garcia-Quevedo (2004) on R&D subsidies (39 empirical studies\*74 estimates) (IT: 1)
  - Ys are dummies for positive effect or for crowding-out
  - None of the observed study characteristics has an influence on the probability of a positive result; weak evidence of crowding out
- Negassi and Sattin (2014) (60\*625) (IT: 3); Castellacci and Mee Lie (2015) (34\*404) (IT:1) ; Gaillard-Ladinska et al (2015) (16\*82 + 9\*95) (IT: 0) on tax incentives/tax credits for R&D
  - $\gamma$  is the effect of tax credit on R&D investment (additionality ratio or user cost elasticity)
  - tax credit increases R&D expenditures particularly in the high-technology industry (1)
  - the additionality effect of R&D tax credits is stronger for SMEs, firms in the service sectors, and firms in low-tech sectors (2)
  - a reduction in the user cost of capital of ten percent raises stock of R&D capital by 1.3 percent and flow of R&D expenditure by 2.1 percent; the presence of a tax incentive scheme is associated with seven percent more R&D expenditure (3)

# Systematic review, meta-analysis and MRA

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(1) to perform a comprehensive review of the evidence, extract data from the studies that are included in the review and categorise the available information

(2) to combine data to produce a summary result of the systematic review

(3) to perform the meta-analysis, and, in particular:

- to avoid the simple vote count (publication bias)
- to assess the influence of some programme or study characteristics on the probability of particular results (e.g. probability of positive treatment effects)
- to test whether the influence found in the sample of studies under scrutiny is caused by something other than mere random chance

# Data

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- ✓ 43 published and unpublished articles written from 2000 on \* 478 estimates, adopting the tools of the conterfactual approach (Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009)

$$y_i = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if the estimate is significantly positive} \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

- ✓ Outcome variable: treatment effect
- ✓ Predictors: type of incentives, policy level at which the intervention is implemented, target of the interventions, year in which the programme is implemented, type of outcome on which treatment effects are estimated, timing of estimated impact, number of firms involved in the estimation, basic methodology used for estimation, publication status of article, ...

Outcome variable and some predictors are measured at the level of estimates, while other predictors are defined /constant at the study level!

Each study usually contains a number of estimates (11 on average)

	At the level of estimates Mean	At the level of studies Group mean
<b>Response variable:</b> treatment effect is significantly positive	0.337	
At least one treatment effect is significantly positive		0.907
<b>Variables that are constant within studies</b>		
Study was published in a journal	0.536	0.651
Study uses administrative rather than survey data	0.900	0.837
<i>Programme type</i>		
R&D	0.559	0.512
investments	0.343	0.372
bank loans	0.098	0.116
<b>Variables that are not always constant within studies</b>		
Outcome directly affected by the programme	0.297	0.356
Non simultaneous treatment effect	0.609	0.442
N. of firms involved in estimation	4158	5086
<i>Target firms</i>		
Target all firms	0.776	0.605
Target SMEs only	0.140	0.244
unspecified	0.084	0.151

	At the level of estimates	At the level of studies
	Mean	Group mean
<i>Government level delivering the programme</i>		
national	0.362	0.430
regional	0.554	0.419
unspecified or mixed	0.084	0.151
<i>Incentive type</i>		
unspecified or mixed	0.109	0.197
loan	0.289	0.201
grant	0.554	0.528
tax credit	0.048	0.074
<i>Basic methodology used for estimation</i>		
DID	0.201	0.205
RDD	0.098	0.128
matched DID	0.425	0.209
matching	0.218	0.322
other	0.059	0.136
<i>Year of the programme</i>		
late 2000s	0.149	0.209
earlier	0.851	0.791
Number of observations	478	43

# Vote counts

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Type of programme	Significantly positive	Insignificant	Significantly negative	Total
R&D	76 (28.5%)	183 (68.5%)	8 (3.0%)	267 (100%)
Investment	59 (36.0%)	87 (53.0%)	18 (11.0%)	164 (100%)
Bank loans	26 (55.3%)	16 (34.0%)	5 (10.6%)	47 (100%)
Total	161 (33.7%)	286 (59.8%)	31 (6.5%)	478 (100%)

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# The meta-regression model

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- We are interested in the probability that the response is 1 as a function of:  
i) the predictors  $\mathbf{x}_i$  and ii) a term of unobserved heterogeneity at the study level  $u_s$   $E(y_i|\mathbf{x}_i, u_s) = \Pr(y_i = 1 | \mathbf{x}_i, u_s)$
- $u_s$  is important as observations from a same study cannot be assumed independent!
- Therefore, we estimate the following random-intercept logit multilevel model

$$\text{logit}\{\Pr(y_{is} = 1 | \mathbf{x}_{is}, u_s)\} = \beta_0^C + \boldsymbol{\beta}^C \mathbf{x}_{is} + u_s$$

where coefficients  $\beta^C$  represent the change in the log odds ratio of having a significantly positive treatment effect estimate for a one unit increase in the predictor, conditional on  $u_s$ . The latter refers to the random error component for the deviation of the intercept of a group from the overall intercept.

- By means of the following nonlinear transformation we can use coefficients to compute probabilities

$$\Pr(y_{is} = 1 | \mathbf{x}_{is}, u_s) = \frac{\exp(\beta_0^C + \boldsymbol{\beta}^C \mathbf{x}_{is} + u_s)}{1 + \exp(\beta_0^C + \boldsymbol{\beta}^C \mathbf{x}_{is} + u_s)}$$

# Two groups of estimates

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- In studies using survey data, some of the previous variables are not specified (government level delivering the programme, type of targeting underlying this programme, ...).
- Instead of fixing an unspecified category in these variables (which would coincide with that indicating data source) we specify two different groups:
  - The whole group of 43 studies, including 478 available estimates and a smaller set of covariates that are specified for all estimates;
  - A smaller group of 36 studies NOT using survey data, including 430 estimates and the complete set of covariates characterizing them

# Results: Coefficient estimates

	<i>FULL SAMPLE</i>	<i>RESTRICTED SAMPLE</i>
<i>FIXED PART</i>		
R&D (base)	0 (.)	0 (.)
bank credit	1100 (1190)	2713 (1670)
investments	0.983 (0.643)	1.741** (0.774)
national (base)		0 (.)
regional		1.181* (0.674)
targets all firms (base)		0 (.)
targets SMEs only		-1.835* (0.980)
loan (base)	0 (.)	0 (.)
grant	0.103 (0.688)	-0.672 (0.875)
tax credit	0.467 (1121)	-0.122 (1408)
unspecified or mixed	1.937** (0.951)	2523 (1877)
other outcome (base)	0 (.)	0 (.)
directly affected outcome	2.344*** (0.725)	2.909*** (0.954)
N. of firms	-0.00000809 (0.0000194)	-0.00000168 (0.0000210)
DID (base)	0 (.)	0 (.)
RDD	1369 (0.860)	1.753* (0.962)
matched DID	-0.0331 (0.771)	-0.248 (0.899)
matching	1042 (0.711)	1472 (0.905)
other method	0.502 (0.992)	0.629 (1386)

Baseline:

R&D programme

late 2000s

repayable loans

DID approach

Outcome observed well after treatment receipt

Outcome is not directly affected by this type of

programme

Survey data

Study did not appear on a scientific journal

Restricted sample:

administrative data

national programme

all firms

# Results: Coefficient estimates (cont)

	<i>FULL SAMPLE</i>	<i>RESTRICTED SAMPLE</i>
implemented in late 2000s (base)	0 ( )	0 ( )
implemented earlier	0.819 (0.829)	1329 (0.968)
survey data (base)	0 ( )	
administrative data	2.591** (1220)	
lagged estimate (base)	0 ( )	0 ( )
simultaneous estimate	-0.502 (0.338)	-0.510 (0.364)
appeared in other outlet (base)	0 ( )	0 ( )
published in journal	-0.507 (0.592)	-0.159 (0.704)
R&D # directly affected outcome (base)	0 ( )	0 ( )
bank credit # directly affected outcome	-1145 (1036)	-1644 (1211)
investments # directly affected outcome	-1.493* (0.843)	-2.057** (1040)
Overall intercept	-4.418** -1716	-2.858* -1513
<i>RANDOM PART</i>		
$\sigma_{\epsilon}^2$	1039 (0.517)	0.957 (0.548)
LR test vs. logistic regression	17.90***	11.71***
Observations	478	430
Studies	43	36
AIC	544.4	485.8
Log likelihood	-253.2	-222.9

Interaction:  
programme type \* type of  
outcome variable

# No publication bias

*Coefficient for the number of firms involved in estimation when the response variable is (A) a significantly positive or (B) a significantly negative treatment effect*

<i>(A)</i> <i>Significantly positive</i>		<i>(B)</i> <i>Significantly negative</i>	
<i>FULL SAMPLE</i>	<i>RESTR. SAMPLE</i>	<i>FULL SAMPLE</i>	<i>RESTR. SAMPLE</i>
-0.0000081	-0.0000017	0.0000140	-0.0000148
(0.0000194)	(0.0000210)	(0.0000237)	(0.0000286)

The increase in sample size is associated ...

- neither with a higher probability of having significantly positive effects
- nor with a higher probability of having significantly negative effects

which enables us to deem that our analysis is very unlikely to suffer from publication bias

# Results for some common policy schemes

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- A. R&D grant, targeting both small and larger firms
- B. Guaranteed loan for SMEs only
- C. Investment grant, targeting both small and larger firms

We fix predictors at particular values representing policy schemes, we also fix all  $u_s$  at their mean value of zero

We predict probabilities of success depending on the fact that:

- the outcome variable which the treatment effect refers to is a variable that the programme in question is intended to modify in a direct way
- the government level delivering the programme is national or regional

# R&D grants for all firms

*Average adjusted probability predictions; random effects fixed at zero*

	(A) whatever level	(B) national level	(C) regional level	(C - B) difference
DIRECTLY AFFECTED OUTCOME	0.732*** (0.070)	0.596** (0.232)	0.813*** (0.083)	0.217 (0.145)
OTHER OUTCOME	0.188*** (0.061)	0.100* (0.056)	0.245*** (0.083)	0.145* (0.080)

*Notes.* Standard errors in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

# Guaranteed loans for SMEs

*Average adjusted probability predictions; random effects fixed at zero*

	(A) whatever level	(B) national level	(C) regional level	(C - B) difference
DIRECTLY AFFECTED OUTCOME	0.715*** (0.161)	0.575*** (0.215)	0.799*** (0.145)	0.224 (0.139)
OTHER OUTCOME	0.461** (0.214)	0.309 (0.203)	0.557** (0.233)	0.248* (0.137)

*Notes.* Standard errors in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

# Investment grants for all firms

*Average adjusted probability predictions; random effects fixed at zero*

	(A) whatever level	(B) national level	(C) regional level	(C - B) difference
DIRECTLY AFFECTED OUTCOME	0.675*** (0.112)	0.527*** (0.146)	0.764*** (0.116)	0.238* (0.131)
OTHER OUTCOME	0.501*** (0.105)	0.346*** (0.115)	0.599*** (0.126)	0.253* (0.137)

*Notes.* Standard errors in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

# Exposure to market failures and programme success (in progress)


We also collected 425 estimates estimated on or referred to subsamples of firms (heterogeneity of effects). According to the market failure type addressed by each program type in mind we can classify them as follows:

- 154 estimates refer to firms that can be regarded as relatively disadvantaged
- 109 refer to firms that can be regarded as not disadvantaged
- 162 refer to firms whose classification does not fall into the previous dichotomy


On these 425 obs., and adding the new covariate to the previous model (full sample specification), we obtain the following differential probabilities in favour of disadvantaged firms...

*Average adjusted differential probability predictions; random effects fixed at zero*

Directly affected outcome



Other outcome



*Notes.* Solid bar: difference is statistically significant at 10% or better

# Conclusion and future steps

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- Probability of some success is non negligible
- More positive effects when the outcome variable is directly affected by the policy
- Greater effectiveness of policies administered at regional level. However, we have to consider that evaluations are mostly referred to regions having a decent quality of government (Rodríguez-Pose and Garcilazo, 2015)
- SMEs policies do not exhibit a great performance ... however, preliminary results suggest that general policies are more effective for firms that are “disadvantaged”
- Improvement of the model with heterogeneity estimates
- Also: inclusion of a few additional evaluation studies appeared in the last few weeks
- On a subset of estimates expressed in the same measurement unit, we will carry out a more traditional MRA with a model for the magnitude of treatment effects